dealtn wrote:I don't select on Yield, nor follow a strict rules based system.
I do keep records of my investments. My ideal timeframe is very short, and hope never to hold a share long enough to receive a dividend, though of course that is a rare occurrence!
One of the things I will do though is make a note of every dividend, as that is part of my Total Return, and in so doing I also note the "progress" of that dividend stream, such that I know how much that total dividend received is as a % of my initial investment, and also how much the current dividend is forecast to be as a similar % of that initial investment.
As I say I don't use yield as an investment metric anyway, and I wouldn't be using either of these "on cost" measures as part of any criteria for selection were I disposed to use "yield". They do however prove a useful "simple" benchmark (in addition to change in price - hopefully upwards!) as a quantifier of the "success" of the investment. Of course "time invested" is a huge part of this too, so needs to be factored in as well. But that is part of the less simple benchmark of success such as XIRR/Total Return.
I don't see why a HYP investor couldn't do something similar to measure "success" (even if that ignored capital value change), but can't see its relevance to any decision to select shares. I can see how it might be a tool in deciding how successful a share previously selected might be, in the potential position of choosing to sell (if that's allowed) or not. I suspect there are alternative, and perhaps easier ways, of making this analysis though. I am on shakier ground here though as I don't follow this strategy.
(Posted as it has been pointed out to me by Gengulphus that the guidelines addresses the issue of "for the use" of HYP followers, so doesn't exclude non-HYPers on this Board so long as they are providing useful information to HYPers)
On that last point, you should beware of two points: firstly, that providing useful information to HYPers should be restricted pretty much to that useful information (e.g. not other stuff about what type of non-HYP strategy you use), and secondly, that I wasn't speaking authoritatively on what this new board's guidance means, just giving my opinion! I.e. I'd suggest being cautious about how you follow it - and I won't accept any responsibility if trying to follow it goes wrong!
But on your main point about potentially using 'on cost' measures to measure 'success' in a HYP, yes, but they're of limited use. There are basically two situations when they measure 'success' quite well, provided (as you indicate) that they take account of 'time invested', e.g. by suitable annualisation. The first of them is if the position has been closed: even with HYP being an LTBH approach, short holding periods can happen. For example, HYP1's original share Blue Circle Industries was taken over in July 2001 after being held for about 8 months: my calculations in the
TMF thread about it indicate that for £5,000 invested on 13 November 2000, it received about £610 in a special dividend + share consolidation on 19 December 2000 and then around £4,757 in the takeover on 11 July 2001. Between those, it received 961 * 11.65p = £112 on 20 April 2001 from the dividend described in
https://investegate.co.uk/blue-circle-i ... 34274325Z/. Overall, it made a profit of £489 on a cost of £5,000, i.e. a 9.78% profit on cost, on which 2.24% was yield on cost due to the April 2001 dividend and the remaining 7.54% was basically a capital gain (a special dividend + share consolidation having a similar effect to a sale of the shares lost to the consolidation, other than for tax purposes. Annualising it as an "internal rate of return" using the spreadsheet XIRR() function, that's a 17.19% rate of return - so I think one can reckon that the original purchase of Blue Circle was a 'success' for HYP1, albeit a small one and one in which capital was the dominant factor, not income. The capital movement dominating the income is typical when a HYP holding turns out to have a short holding period, by the way, basically because the income is small and the capital movement is often large - but unfortunately it can be in either direction.
The second way an annualised 'on cost' measure can be useful to judge the 'success' of a HYP investment is if the purchased shares have been held long enough for the accumulated income to be a decent return even if the company went bust tomorrow, or less extremely, even if it suffered from a complete cancellation of dividends for several years and the consequent major share price fall. E.g. suppose someone bought 1000 BATS shares twenty years ago. The closing share price on Friday 23 June 2000 was 422p; adding reasonable trading costs, the shares would have cost them about £4,250. Since then, I'm fairly certain their number of shares would have remained unaltered by corporate actions, so they'll have received 1000 times all of the dividends in
https://dividenddata.co.uk/dividend-his ... ?epic=bats that have gone ex-dividend in those 20 years. That's all of the dividends listed for 2000 to 2019 plus the Q1 dividend for 2020; the total income received amounts to £20,696, getting on for 5 times the original investment (which it will exceed if the next two intended 52.6p interims are paid as planned). A good outcome for that purchase decision in 2000, and the 'internal rate of return' at the current share price of 3055p is a very impressive 18.59%. And even if BATS somehow went bust tomorrow, taking the current capital value of £30,550 out of that rate-of-return calculation, it would still produce a 15.01% rate of return - or if it suffered a complete dividend cut immediately, no dividends for the next five years and an overall 80% loss of capital value over those five years, the resulting rate of return on 24 June 2025 would be 15.51%. Basically, whichever way you look at it, that original June 2000 purchase decision is a very good one...
To deal with an apparent flaw in that argument, by the way, there is a way it could appear to go wrong, namely that the holding could request a further investment by doing a massive rights issue or some similar type of corporate action: such an investment could make the total of the investments into the holding more than the total of its returns, and if the company subsequently went bust without paying any further returns, the overall rate of return would be negative. But the limited-liability nature of shares means that the holding can only request a further investment, not demand one, and that means that the decision whether or not to make the further investment is another purchase decision. So what would basically have happened if one made the further investment and the company subsequently went bust without paying any further returns is that the June 2000 purchase decision was a very good one, but the further-investment purchase decision was a very bad one, more than losing what the June 2000 purchase decision had gained...
It seems just about inconceivable that anything as BATS going bust tomorrow will happen, of course - but the point is that the June 2000 purchase decision will turn out to be a very good one even in the absolute worst case for what happens next: the HYPer can throw away the gains from that decision, but not have them 'stolen' by investment events beyond his or her control. The method does eventually give a firm indication of the 'success' of a HYP investment... But there is a practical problem with using it, namely that it takes many years to arrive at a reasonably firm conclusion. Even for what has turned out to be one of the most outstanding HYP purchase decisions, to buy BATS in June 2000, it would have taken nine years for the if-BATS-went-bust-tomorrow worst case to be sure of not losing money in nominal terms - the June 2009 payment of £616 would have made the cumulative dividends more than the original cost (or equivalently, the cumulative yield-on-cost greater than 100%) and the worst-case rate of return just positive at 0.20%. Another year would have taken that worst-case rate of return up to 3.61%, basically making it inflation-beating, and the next three years beyond that would take it up to 6.28%, then 8.36%, then 9.95%, which are the sorts of levels I think can reasonably be regarded as indicating clearly 'successful' investments.
So basically, even for a HYP share as outstandingly good as BATS in 2000 has turned out to be, it takes something of the order of twelve years to very firmly conclude that the purchase decision was a good one. For HYP shares that have been good, but not that outstandingly good, it will take longer. Of course, one can get a less firm (but still pretty good) indication after rather fewer years - for instance, six years after that BATS purchase, after it had paid its May 2005 dividend, it had returned just over half of the initial £4,250 cost in dividends, its historical dividend had risen nearly 80% since purchase and its share price had more than tripled to 1358p on 23 June 2006. It would have taken a pretty major disaster striking the company to get rid of that success, so one could have been reasonably confident that the original purchase decision was a good one - but not certain.
To try to summarise this, one can get a decent indication of investment 'success' from yield-on-cost type calculations, but basically only after
either the position has been closed (as occasionally happens by takeover even in the most 'purist' HYPs)
or the position has been running for a considerable number of years - in round number terms, think 5+ years for a decent indication about an outstandingly good HYP share, and double that number of years for each of a really firm indication or a less good HYP share. And when it takes multiple years, you essentially need to annualise the yield-on-cost for all of those years, not look at the yield-on-cost for the final year.
Gengulphus