Boeing

[AsleepInYorkshire]

Lootman

Having spent a goodly amount of my working life involved in Airline Pilot training and examining I wanted to make a comment about 1500 hours flying versus 250 hours. Basically it comes down to what goes on in those hours. 1500 hours flying round in blue skies in a bug smasher is no substitute for a carefully crafted course (that includes 250 hours of flying) to produce an 'airline pilot'. Modern airliners are complex pieces of machinery that require expensive specialist training to be able to operate effectively. You do not get this down at the local aero club building flying hours. Whilst i acknowledge for a time their was very much a worry that the industry was producing 'children of magenta' that has been recognised and the training mitigates it.

As an aside London Fire Service could probably learn from the aviation industry in how to handle situations when things go away from the script/checklist. I wonder if their leadership will reach out to other industries for ideas and advice on how to train their 'Fire Captains'.

As to the MAX and it's future what will happen to Ryanair if this isn't resolved quickly. Will MOL lose his competitive advantage as he ends up flying round in 'old' 737's with a higher fuel burn than easyJets and others Airbus NEO's. MOL seems to have doubled down on his bet with the Max, he has been right about most things, on this, time will tell.

What a fantastic job you've had. I wonder if I may venture to ask a question please? I was told that in the RAF that pilot training will at some point select those with "slightly" faster reflex's to fly "fighter" jets and those with slightly slower reflex's to fly helicopters. I am genuinely not sure if this is true or not.

But it struck me that the ability to "think and act well" in an emergency could make a difference to the outcome. With a cacophony of "warnings" constantly going off in the cockpit do the "engineers" need to consider a point at which designed in safety alerts actually become overwhelming to the senses and create in themselves a problem for the pilots to overcome or does the training rely upon the pilots ability to "think over" all the noise?

I think MOL is underthinking the amount of information that is "out there" at any point in time. The internet really does make information available very quickly. And nowadays most people expect to fly and live. 50 years ago the risk was "ours" to take. As you say time will tell ... but I think MOL isn't hedging his bet too well and of course that's his gamble to take.

AiYn'U

[AsleepInYorkshire]

26th December 2019
Boeing Promotes 737 MAX Safety To The Public, Where 40% Don’t Want To Fly On A MAX
https://www.forbes.com/sites/willhorton ... ccb0b87416

For any passenger uneasy about flying on a Boeing 737 MAX after its two deadly crashes and worldwide grounding, Boeing 737 chief pilot Jennifer Henderson has a message: “When the 737 MAX returns to service, I would absolutely put my family on this airplane.”

I've read the above article more than once and am not entirely sure I know what the journalist is really trying to say. Could be me just missing an obvious point or could be "fluffy journalism"?

Boeing have insisted they will try to rebuild trust in them and the grounded Max.

• 10th March 2019 - 149 die as new Boeing 737 Max crashes shortly after take off
• 11th March 2019 - China's Civil Aviation Authority first to ground the Max
• 12th March 2019 - Muilenberg, Boeing's CEO informs President Trump the aircraft is safe and reliable. An email to Boeing employee's from Muilenberg states "We are confident in the safety of the 737 MAX,"

AiYn'U

[AsleepInYorkshire]

26th December 2019
Boeing 737 Max crisis adviser Michael Luttig to retire
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/26/boeing- ... etire.html

Boeing said on Thursday Michael Luttig, who was appointed senior adviser to the planemaker’s board amid the 737 Max crisis in May, will retire at the end of the year.

Now ... now ... now they are getting it. This doesn't change the past. It doesn't change the present. It doesn't change the cost or the timelines. No one can change them, albeit they can be influenced within a range. And this could be a signal that, ultimately, Boeing may be starting down a road that will allow them to have positive influences over the "end out" costs towards a lower end. More signals are needed. More positive steps needed. Lots of them.

I can't see much change out of $30-$40bn and the Max being retired early. Can I reiterate that in the New Year I think Boeing should suspend dividend payments. They would be stupid not to. Boeing have, in my opinion slammed every open door they had, to date, in their own faces. It was theirs to lose and they lost it well.

And I am unable to forget that they took 346 lives and still did not accept responsibility. Indeed it took the Chinese Civil Air Authority to ground the Max before the rest of the world followed suit.

Boeing's a mess. A serious mess. Made worse over the last nine months. I don't think it will get any better and a request for more money will "hurt bad". I'd like someone to tell me what the other options are as I simply cannot see any.

AiYn'U

[AsleepInYorkshire]

26th December 2019
Boeing: The Challenge Is Changing The Culture
https://seekingalpha.com/article/431420 ... ng-culture

In recent years, under the guidance of Mr. Muilenburg and CFO Smith the company has changed its financial structure and added lots and lots of long-term debt to the balance sheet and has goosed up its stock price, not only with this leverage but with very ample cash dividends and stock buybacks.

AiYn'U

[flyer61]

In answer to the question concerning 'reflex's' and pilots aptitude there is no simple answer. Mental capacity for the job is far more important IMHO. You can have the best set of hands for flying but be a crap fighter pilot. The ability to think whilst flying though is essential. Also the ability to react well under real pressure is a necessary trait. Within modern training we refer to it as 'muscle memory' ie when all the bells and whistles are going do you react correctly in flying the aircraft first. As you say a lot of the alarms/warnings etc can be very distracting but reacting correctly every time is what is trained initially and at all subsequent recurrent checks.

Military training has evolved significantly over the years however the one thing the RAF has failed miserably at is conducting it in a timely manner. You will note the new government has given all 3 service chiefs a rollicking about one area of their responsibility that is a shambles. In the RAF's case it is Fighter Pilot training.

Check 6!

[AsleepInYorkshire]

27th December 2019
Boeing 737 Max: When will it return to service and can passengers avoid flying on one?
https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/ne ... 61701.html

Out of more than 1,600 self-selecting responses in the first three hours, only one in four travellers say they would trust the experts and fly confidently on the plane.

Forty-four per cent of respondents want to wait and see if the aircraft performs safely for a year or two.
But the remaining 31 per cent say they will never fly on the aircraft.

AiYn'U

[AsleepInYorkshire]

29th December 2019
Boeing’s 737 MAX crisis leaves it badly behind in ‘arms race’ for next decade’s jets
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... ades-jets/

Through it all, said Richard Aboulafia, vice president of analysis at aviation consulting firm Teal Group, Boeing has displayed “an absence of leadership, an absence of strategy and an inability to communicate.”

AiYn'U

[AsleepInYorkshire]

29th December 2019
Boeing's New CEO Won't Solve The Underlying Problem
Boeing's key long-term challenge is striking a better balance between prioritizing excellence in engineering and maximizing cash flow. Given that former CEO Dennis Muilenberg (an engineer) wasn't able to balance these competing interests effectively, it's not clear what kind of leader would be more successful.

30th December 2019
Boeing's 737 Max Aircraft Production Suspension to Aid Airbus.
Ever since the second crash involving the 737 Max jet, shares of Boeing have lost 16% against the industry’s growth of 6.9%. On the other hand, shares of Airbus have witnessed 18.1% growth during the same time frame. This certainly reflects Boeing’s slowdown in the global aviation market and Airbus' reigning supremacy over the former.

There does seem to be a growing consensus that Boeing's problems are not just about a short term fix and [however complicated] returning the Max to service but more about the longer term issue of what follows the Max. Either way I suspect the shareholders of Boeing are not going to see the returns they have become used to in the last five years. In my opinion Muilenberg has been [found] guilty of manipulating EPS. The share buy backs have been done at the expense of the longer term. Not only has there been a significant omission in R&D for future single aisle airframes but there has also been an increase in long term debt. Muilenberg appears to have [literally] thrown the baby out with the bathwater. And he's done it as the growth in air travel is weakening. A hat-trick of home goals.

AiYn'U

[AsleepInYorkshire]

31st December 2019
Turkish Airlines, Boeing reach 737 MAX compensation deal
Turkey's Hurriyet newspaper said it was worth $225m - $150m in compensation and $75m covering things such as spare parts and training.

If the above figures are reliable it would indicate a sum of $9,375,000 per aircraft. As an "indicative" total cost to Boeing for 400 grounded vehicles this is just short of $4bn. All very "what if" though.

AiYn'U

[AsleepInYorkshire]

31st December 2019
Boeing Shares Slip Amid Accord to Compensate Turkish Airlines for 737 MAX Grounding

The deal will halt payments for all the 737 MAX jets it bought this year, according to Hurriyet. Boeing's payments will cover only the airline's losses for this year, and it retains the right to ask for payments to cover future losses.

It did occur to me [very much after the event] that the deal "reached" by Boeing/Turkish Airlines was maybe "timebound". This article seems to suggest it is. And that boundary has [just] been passed.

What Boeing do "for one" will "probably" establish what they do for the rest.

AiYn'U

[AsleepInYorkshire]

3rd January 2020
The 1997 merger that paved the way for the Boeing 737 Max crisis

In the months since the crashes, longtime Boeing customers, such as United Airlines, have turned to Airbus instead—particularly amid fears passengers will refuse to fly the 737 when it returns to service.

This is a lengthy and slightly more comprehensive report in which the author suggests that Boeing's current problems are the result of its merger with McDonnel Douglas.

I suspect that the report holds some form of truth.

Again there's mention that the flying public may chose not to get back on this vehicle if it returns to service. That will not be a risk any airline wants to burden themselves with, Ryanair' CEO's comments aside. I would suggest that ultimately this risk will be borne by Boeing shareholders either through vastly reduced front end prices or "rebates" based on actual numbers boarding the returned aircraft.

Boeing will be aware of the cost at which it cannot return the Max to profitable service. Having thought about this I suspect that this isn't a "drop dead line in the sand" but more a point at which they need to keep their skilled employees "active" even if that comes at a loss. Such being a lesser loss when factoring in the costs of fluctuating employment levels and any timelines for a potential new single aisle offering.

AiYn'U

[AsleepInYorkshire]

5th January 2020
Boeing, FAA reviewing wiring issue on grounded 737 MAX
The New York Times reported Boeing is reviewing whether two bundles of wiring are too close together, which could lead to a short circuit and potentially result in a crash if pilots did not respond appropriately.
...
The wiring issue could push back the return of the MAX, the officials added. Reuters has reported previously the FAA is not likely to approve the plane until at least February and might not until March or later.

Boeing 737 Max investigation after several plane crashes revealed additional concerns with wiring and engines
If the wiring needs to be fixed, Boeing says it would take one to two hours per plane to separate the bundles using a clamp. But changing the wiring could also do additional damage during the repair process, so Boeing is hoping to avoid the possibility.
...
In addition, the engine manufacturers discovered a possible weakness that could cause a rotor to shatter, and Boeing found a manufacturing problem that caused workers to inadvertently remove panel coating that protects the fuel tank and fuel lines from a lightning strike.

AiYn'U

[AsleepInYorkshire]

6th January 2020
Boeing may tap the bond market for the first time since July as 737 Max costs swell (BA)
Analysts estimate that Boeing will raise as much as $5 billion in extra debt to help cover expenses, which could be more than $15 billion in the first half of 2020, The Journal reported.

American Airlines reaches settlement with Boeing for 737 MAX compensation in 2019
Jan 6 (Reuters) - American Airlines Group Inc said on Monday it had reached a confidential agreement with Boeing Co to address damages the airline incurred in 2019 due to the ongoing grounding of its fleet of Boeing 737 MAX aircraft.

Aeromexico reaches compensation deal with Boeing over MAX crisis
(Reuters) - Mexican airline Aeromexico (AEROMEX.MX) said on Monday it had reached a compensation deal with Boeing Co (BA.N) related to the grounding of the planemaker’s 737 MAX aircraft, joining a growing list of global airlines settling with the U.S. company.

AiYn'U

[AsleepInYorkshire]

7th January 2020
In U-turn, Boeing recommends 737 MAX simulator training for pilots
Boeing Co (BA.N) said on Tuesday it was recommending that airline pilots undergo simulator training before they resume flying the 737 MAX, a shift from its previous position that pilots only needed computer-based training on new software following two fatal crashes.

The culture of any company cannot change overnight. However, there are always pivotal points at which it perhaps becomes evident that change is on the menu. In my mind this marks one such occasion for Boeing. But I would like to add, purely as speculation that this doesn't mean Boeing like what they are doing. But for now they have clearly understood that fundamentally simulator training on this vehicle is not going to disappear because they say it's not needed. This isn't a change in culture. But, for me, its the first signs that Boeing have started to think along a different route. Ultimately the additional training will delay any return and increase costs accordingly. Not, I should add, that the travelling public would ask for any less.

AiYn'U

[scotia]

News Item on the BBC Site today:-
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-51058929

One unnamed employee wrote in an exchange of instant messages in April 2017: "This airplane is designed by clowns who in turn are supervised by monkeys."
The documents, which have been published by the Washington Post, appear to show that Boeing rejected pilots being trained on simulators, which would have led to higher costs for the firm.

I have a certain sympathy for the Boeing worker who made the clowns statement. I found it near unbelievable that a software design team could have produced software which carried out potentially fatal actions due to faulty readings from a single input transducer, when the aircraft was equipped with two such transducers. Anyone concerned with such software and the operation of an aircraft would know that this was a single point of critical failure - and there was a trivial way of avoiding it - by checking the two transducers. I have thought a fair amount about this. Surely the Boeing in-house software team are not so incompetent to allow this to happen. Was it farmed out to a software house who's programmers were way out of their depth - are those the clowns?
On the second part, which concerns Boeing being adamant about no simulator training being required, the article makes chilling reading in the way that Boeing believed they could bully any regulator who thought otherwise.
Hopefully this is all in the past, and Boeing have mended their ways - but perhaps some other of their past actions (unconnected with the 737MAX) will need to be re-visited with more careful scrutiny.

[ReformedCharacter]

News Item on the BBC Site today:-
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-51058929

One unnamed employee wrote in an exchange of instant messages in April 2017: "This airplane is designed by clowns who in turn are supervised by monkeys."
The documents, which have been published by the Washington Post, appear to show that Boeing rejected pilots being trained on simulators, which would have led to higher costs for the firm.

I have a certain sympathy for the Boeing worker who made the clowns statement. I found it near unbelievable that a software design team could have produced software which carried out potentially fatal actions due to faulty readings from a single input transducer, when the aircraft was equipped with two such transducers. Anyone concerned with such software and the operation of an aircraft would know that this was a single point of critical failure - and there was a trivial way of avoiding it - by checking the two transducers.

Yes, quite. The whole story is almost unbelievable. At least it's all coming out now but terrible that it cost so many lives. I don't mean to be vindictive but some of the people who are responsible for these crass decisions should see the inside of a prison for a while, if only to dissuade others from treating the safety of people with such disdain.

RC

[AsleepInYorkshire]

10th January 2020
https://www.riverbender.com/sports-news/details.cfm?id=291815

Employee 1: “It’s such a s hit show”
Employee 2: “totally. I’ll be shocked if the FAA passes this turd”
—Chat log between Boeing employees, May 18, 2018

If this article is quoting honestly then this comment can be viewed from many angles, none of which really indicate Boeing's culture was about the safety of passengers & crew flying onboard the Max.

AiYn'U

[AsleepInYorkshire]

10th January 2020
346 potentially saved if Boeing was 'more forthcoming' with communications, lawmaker says
DeFazio said he hopes DOJ will "vigorously pursuing whatever appropriate criminal charges may be brought," but added, "in terms of a civil case, Boeing might as well just give away the bank now."
...
DeFazio has repeatedly raised the alarm about the safety culture inside Boeing -- specifically production pressures that might indicate the company put profit over safety.

(Reuters) - Boeing Co's <BA.N> ousted chief executive officer, Dennis Muilenburg, is leaving the company with $62 million in compensation and pension benefits but will receive no severance pay in the wake of the 737 MAX crisis.

Two aircraft fell out of the sky with 346 souls on board. These events occurred on Muilenberg's watch.

AiYn'U

[richfool]

10th January 2020
https://www.riverbender.com/sports-news/details.cfm?id=291815

Employee 1: “It’s such a s hit show”
Employee 2: “totally. I’ll be shocked if the FAA passes this turd”
—Chat log between Boeing employees, May 18, 2018

If this article is quoting honestly then this comment can be viewed from many angles, none of which really indicate Boeing's culture was about the safety of passengers & crew flying onboard the Max.

AiYn'U

Indeed. It sounds rather like: "regulated by monkeys", too, and gullible ones at that.

[AsleepInYorkshire]

10th January 2020
https://www.riverbender.com/sports-news/details.cfm?id=291815

Employee 1: “It’s such a s hit show”
Employee 2: “totally. I’ll be shocked if the FAA passes this turd”
—Chat log between Boeing employees, May 18, 2018

If this article is quoting honestly then this comment can be viewed from many angles, none of which really indicate Boeing's culture was about the safety of passengers & crew flying onboard the Max.

AiYn'U

Indeed. It sounds rather like: "regulated by monkeys", too, and gullible ones at that.

Yes. It's one issue that Boeing's culture had sunk to this level but for the FAA to allow this is another entirely different issue. Neither is worse than the other in my opinion. This thread is clearly aligned with the financial issues at Boeing and I don't want to steer off course accordingly. However, I hope, purely on behalf of those lost souls and those who have survived them that two "entities" enter the dock.

I would also add that I have given some thought to the removal of Muilenberg. I think Boeing may have realised that they needed to put some space between them both. Muilenberg will, I am in no doubt, come under increasing scrutiny, which I believe is as it should be.

The new CEO commences on Monday. I think I'd liken this to being promoted to Captain of the Titanic an hour after it has collided with the iceberg. In the coming days, weeks, months and years Boeing is going to have to rebuild its culture. I think current shareholders will begin to feel increasing pains as time advances. There are no short term fixes to this one, albeit the new CEO can and must influence the timelines for the development of a new culture constructively. And if I could give him one piece of advice it would be not to start dressing any more company turds up as something they're not.

AiYn'U